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REGRADED: UNCLASSIFIED
By authority of JCS letter dated 24 March 1959
by Ed Tait on 6/26/59

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DECLASSIFIED - ~~DOD Directive No. 5200.9, 27 September 1958~~
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MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER, MIS

SUBJECT: Chinese Radio Intercept Activities.

1. Both command channel cables and Top Secret cables received from the Special Security Officer in India indicate that the Chinese are conducting radio intercept work which at least involves traffic analysis. The command channel reports are as follows:

a. 29 November 1944 (CFBX 27648): "Headquarters of various divisions have been identified through radio interception by Chinese (a method which has proven satisfactory in the past) at the following locations ****."

b. 29 November (CFBX 27649): "Sino G-2 gives following locations for division headquarters as of 27 November, based on radio interception and identification ****."

c. 16 December 1944 (CFBX 29291): "Sino G-2 stated that four radio stations of 11 Army Advance Command Post which closed down at Kweilin three days ago now identified in Liuchow while one of two remaining in Kweilin has closed down."

2. According to a cable dated 1 January from the Special Security Officer at New Delhi, Chinese G-2 gave Colonel Dickey (who is G-2 China Theater) information that on 27 December the headquarters of the Sixth Area Army (located at Hanyueh) sent 30 urgent messages to Hengyang and that on the same date the headquarters of the Fourteenth Area Army (Manila) sent 18 messages to the headquarters of the Eleventh Army (Kweilin or Liuchow). The Special Security Officer states that presumably this was based on traffic analysis but that the Chinese would not be specific.

3. It is believed that some investigation should be made to determine the extent to which the Chinese are conducting radio intercept activities, and if possible, the degree of success which they are

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achieving. Also, if possible, it should be determined whether these activities are widely known. It is suggested that this can be done through Colonel Bickwit of the SIS-CBI, working together with the Special Security Officer.

4. A question also arises from the security standpoint regarding the transmission of information of this character or of references thereto in the regular command channel system. Our own traffic analysis information, though classified as Thumb and Secret, is exchanged with field commands through the special Ultra channel and the security regulations provide that the special channel shall be used for traffic analysis information. Since there is a Special Security Officer in Chungking, it would be possible to have the information received from the Chinese transmitted over this channel. However, if the information is not handled in a secure manner in Chungking, it is possible that having it sent over the special channel might endanger the security of the channel.

5. It is recommended:

a. That the Signal Security Agency be requested to have Colonel Bickwit make a discreet investigation of the present status of Chinese radio intercept activities relating to the Japanese Army traffic.

b. That Lt Colonel Wyatt be directed to have Captain Colclough discuss the subject with the Commanding General, China Theater, with a view to determining the best manner of handling such information.

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